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Sino-American rapprochement resulted in detente by breaking the Sino-American Cold War 
that dominated Asia after World War Ⅱ. It also had a great impact on sustaining regional 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. This article analyzes Korean diplomacy toward Asia under 
detente in relation to the ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council). This article explains why 
ASPAC became obsolete and how the Korean government attempted to preserve the ASPAC 
in the face of dismantlement while easing of strained relations among the states in the region. 
There were two reasons for the failure of ASPAC. The main external reason was that Sino-
American rapprochement, in conjunction with Sino-Japanese normalization, ended the 
Cold War in East Asia. As a result, ASPAC was longer needed to resist Communist China. 
The internal reason of ASPAC was the problem with Taiwan’s membership. Some member 
countries were unwilling to take an active part in ASPAC, which Taiwan joined, while they 
started to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China. Facing the crisis of the ASPAC 
dismantling, the Korean government attempted to sustain ASPAC by appealing to the US 
government and by persuading Taiwan. Nevertheless, the diplomatic efforts of the Korean 
government failed because of the negative response of the US government and resistance of 
Taiwan.
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I. INTRodUCTIoN
This thesis discusses Republic of Korea (RoK) diplomacy during the period 
of détente in the context of the collapse of the Asian and Pacific Council 
(ASPAC). The purpose is to identify why ASPAC met its demise by looking at 
the process of collapse which began as US-China and China-Japan relations 
started to thaw. It also aims to review the effort the RoK made to prevent the 
collapse of ASPAC.
ASPAC was established during the time when China successfully 
conducted a nuclear test and the US probe into Vietnam began in earnest. 
Its purpose was to solidify the alliance among democratic countries in the 
Asia region and it was formed under the leadership of the RoK government. 
At that time, some Asian countries hesitated to become a part of ASPAC 
since it was led by the anti-communist RoK, which made ASPAC seem like 
an anti-communist alliance. However, as the US started to side-support the 
organization and Japan decided to join after normalization of RoK-Japan 
diplomacy, ASPAC was able to launch through the Seoul ministerial meeting 
in June 1966. However, it failed to last long. As US-China relations improved, 
heralding the period of détente, ASPAC participants such as Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand began to normalize their relations with communist China 
and cut ties with Taiwan, another ASPAC member. The seventh Seoul 
ministerial meeting in June 1972 was the last of ASPAC.
The improvement in US-China relations that began when President 
Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972 not only thawed the frozen US-
China relations, but also ushered in the period of détente. In addition, it 
had a significant impact on the existence of the regional organization in 
the Asia region. It was the dismantlement of the Cold War structure in the 
region that led to the collapse of the Ministerial Conference for the Economic 
development of Southeast Asia after the seventh gathering in Singapore was 
unconditionally delayed. The Southeast Asia Treaty organization (SEATo) 
launched under the leadership of the US after the first Vietnam War collapsed 
and the fundamental cause can be found in the betterment of US-China 
relations. ASPAC, established within the context of the Cold War between US 
and China, was no exception to this impact.
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As the global order was being restructured, the RoK government, as 
the main founder of ASPAC, put a significant amount of diplomatic effort 
into preventing the collapse of the organization. The RoK government was 
the host of the seventh ministerial meeting, and it attempted to strengthen 
ASPAC by solidifying the alliance with the neutral Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). After Japan normalized its relations with China, 
the RoK strove to safeguard ASPAC by requesting support from the US 
and pressuring Taiwan to withdraw its membership. However, China was 
already soundly on its feet as a valid member of the global society, and any 
organization that had Taiwan as its member could no longer exist. This thesis 
reviews the RoK effort to save ASPAC and the subsequent failure in the 
larger context of changing global order represented by the détente.  
ASPAC was the backbone of RoK diplomacy in the East Asia region 
from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. ASPAC is also meaningful in that it 
signified that the RoK was breaking way from total dependence on the US 
and expanding its diplomatic horizon in the Asia Pacific region. According to 
dong-Won Lee (1992, 171), the former minister of foreign affairs who played 
a major role in establishing ASPAC, the organization had a more dramatic 
result than the olympics in terms of its politics and culture. Reflecting this 
significance, many empirical studies on ASPAC have been produced since 
2000, and related diplomatic documents have been disclosed.1 However, many 
of these studies focused on the establishment process of the organization and 
historical empirical studies on its development after the launch and its demise 
are absent.2
The two implications of this thesis are as follows. First, it focuses on 
the RoK diplomacy in the East Asia region during the Cold War, a period 
for which existing studies are almost absent. Many researchers during 
this period concentrated on RoK-US and RoK-Japan relations (木宮正史 
2006, 24). This is somewhat related to the fact that the RoK pursued West-
oriented diplomacy that demonstrated pro-US and pro-Japan characteristics. 
1 Kimiya Tadashi (2002), Yanghyeon Jo (2008), Yanghyeon Jo (2009), Mie oba (2004), 
Jingu Cho (2007).
2 As for the evaluation and general study of ASPAC: Seung Hun Lee (1975), Chi Young 
Park (1978), Joon Young Park (1985).
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As discussed earlier, however, ASPAC provided an opportunity to widen 
the RoK’s diplomatic horizons from pro-US and pro-Japan into East 
Asia.   Therefore, ASPAC is perfect for understanding the RoK diplomacy 
during the Cold War.
Second, the study helps us understand the RoK response to the changing 
global environment represented by détente. détente eased tension in the 
region and brought stability to the East Asian security order. However, to the 
RoK, which was confronted with a Cold War of its own, namely, between 
the North and South, détente posed another threat. Although ASPAC 
ultimately failed, the RoK effort to save it gives us a perspective from which 
to understand the RoK diplomacy during the period of détente.
The objective of this thesis lies in viewing the response of the RoK 
government, which was cornered due to the collapse of ASPAC during the 
period of détente in the early 1970s. The primary resource of this thesis is a 
set of diplomatic documents from the RoK, US, Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand. documents from Australia and New Zealand have never before 
been used in ASPAC studies and provide rare and high-quality information 
regarding how the Southeast Asian countries reacted, which was difficult to 
find in materials from the RoK, US, and Japan. It is especially interesting to 
view Malaysia’s reaction considering it is a commonwealth country.
II.  IMPRoVEMENT oF US-CHINA RELATIoNS ANd INI-
TIAL RESPoNSE BY THE RoK goVERNMENT
1. The impact of US-China reconciliation
President Nixon announced that he would visit China on July 15, 1971. This 
not only resolved the deadlock on the Vietnam War, but also improved the 
post-war East Asian security environment. The news forecast a great change 
in the hostile relations between the US and China that had defined the post-
war East Asian regional order. In addition, the thaw served as an opportunity 
to review the necessity of regional organizations established against the Cold 
War backdrop. 
When the news of Nixon’s visit was released, the sixth ASPAC ministerial 
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meeting was being held in Manila, the Philippines, at the Intercontinental 
Hotel. Reflecting the more relaxed global security environment, many of the 
keynote speeches displayed a more flexible attitude. Many countries, except 
for Taiwan and Vietnam, changed their perspective toward China. Taiwan 
engaged in considerable under-the-table lobbying when writing up the joint 
communiqué, but the final decision did not reflect any of Taiwan’s stances. on 
the last day, July 16, the joint communiqué was adopted, ending the meeting.
Against this backdrop, President’s Nixon’s announcement indeed came as 
a shock to all ASPAC participating countries because it almost evaporated 
any significance of the Manila meeting. The heated confrontations among 
participating nations around the China issue lost their meaning in the face 
of improvement in US-China relations, and the joint communiqué no longer 
reflected the latest developments. Foreign Minister Yongsik Kim talked about 
that day as follows: 
 
We had been discussing the East Asia political environment for the past 
couple of days, and all participating nations were indeed shocked by the 
rapid and sudden changes. All stakeholders started to imagine what would 
happen to their own relations with Taiwan and with the People’s Republic of 
China if diplomatic ties were made between the US and China. However, due 
to Taiwan’s attendance at the meeting, no one could say anything. Also due 
to Vietnam’s attendance, no one could say anything about the future of the 
Vietnam War (Yongsik Kim 1987, 214).
 
Except for Malaysia, all ASPAC participants were allies of the US. Therefore, 
the shock of Nixon’s diplomacy was felt very strongly. When the improvement 
of US-China relations became more visible, some participating countries that 
had hoped for such development started the attempt to change the ASPAC 
policy. The most active country was Malaysia.
 
2. ROK policy toward global political changes
 
1) Accelerated efforts of Malaysia to secede from ASPAC
As the host country of the seventh ASPAC ministerial meeting, the RoK 
felt a great responsibility to save ASPAC in the rapidly changing global 
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environment.3 What concerned the RoK the most was Malaysia.   Since the 
federated nation was established in 1963, the Malaysian government had 
continued its non-alliance, neutral stance. Thus, Malaysia was passive in 
ASPAC activities and worried that the organization would become anti-
communist. Malaysia joined ASPAC convinced by its friends Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand, but it seriously considered withdrawing from ASPAC 
before the second ministerial meeting in 1967, which demonstrates Malaysia’s 
persistently passive attitude toward ASPAC.4
In the 1960s, the UK and the US indeed began to downsize their defense 
commitment in Asia, which was evidenced through efforts such as the 
withdrawal of the UK military from the Suez and the US announcement of 
the Nixon doctrine.  during this time, Malaysia had become more neutral 
toward Southeast Asia security as Tun Abdul Razak was appointed as the 
minister in September 1970 following Tunku Abdul Rahman. The non-
alliance policy of Razak became visible in how he responded to Chinese 
representation at the United Nations (UN) in 1971. Malaysia was the only 
country that supported the Albanian proposal advocating for a People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) presence as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council and called for Taiwanese withdrawal. In November of the 
same year, Razak proposed a neutral ASEAN at the fourth ASEAN ministerial 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia accelerated the neutralization policy after 
that and finally, in 1972, Malaysia announced its official withdrawal from the 
Asia Parliamentary Union (APU).5 
3 When the government of the Philippines was preparing the Manila ministerial 
meeting, only Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Vietnam had not hosted the meeting. 
Taiwan and South Vietnam initially wanted to host the next meeting, but they were 
immediately met with opposition from Malaysia. The Philippines government, afraid 
of the halt on ministerial meetings, asked the RoK to hold the next meeting, and the 
RoK accepted the offer with all participants’ agreement. 
4 Telegram to Kuala Lumpur (482), 5, July 1967, ABHS, 950, W4627, PM 434/11/1 Part 5, 
Box 4674, National Archives of New Zealand (hereafter cited as NZNA〕.
5 The entire letter from the RoK ambassador in Malaysia to Kim (MAW-0137) 17, 
January 1972 『ASPAC ministerial meeting, The 7th. Seoul, 14-16, June 1972 (V.3 
member negotiation: Malaysia-Vietnam)』 RoK diplomatic document C-0053-04; 
APU’s purpose is to promote economic and cultural exchange and it was established 
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Neutral stances were visible in ASPAC as well. To realize a neutral ASEAN, 
securing confidence from other non-alliance neutral countries was necessary. 
However, staying in ASPAC made that difficult. Additionally, Malaysia 
wanted to rapidly recover relations with the PRC. Therefore, being in the 
same league with Taiwan in ASPAC was not the optimal option for Malaysia. 
Based on these circumstances, Malaysia sent its deputy minister instead of 
its minister to the Manila ministerial meeting, and at the internal meeting 
held in November, Malaysia set forth measures to slowly minimize its role in 
ASPAC to ultimately withdraw itself.6 
It was the absence of Toh Chor Keat, then the Malaysian ambassador to the 
RoK, at the third permanent member meeting on January 27, 1972, that led 
the RoK to detect Malaysia’s intention. Minister Yongsik Kim felt the strong 
implications of this action; thus, he called Ambassador Keat to his office 
to make sure where Malaysia stood in terms of ASPAC. Ambassador Keat 
asserted that “Malaysia’s foreign policy is not to participate in an international 
organization which has zero communist countries and only has severe anti-
communist countries as its members.” He said that Malaysia would continue 
its passive stance in ASPAC ministerial meetings as an observer and that he 
would be the one attending the meetings, not the minister.7 Kim noticed the 
seriousness of the situation and paid a visit to Malaysia to convince Razak to 
change his stance. 
2) Approach to ASEAN
President Nixon’s visit to China posed a great threat to the RoK. The policy 
that the RoK government chose immediately after the US-China summit to 
re-solidify ASPAC was to change the characteristics of ASPAC and establish 
close cooperation with ASEAN. The intention of the RoK government in 
forming ASPAC was to strengthen the solidarity among free Asian countries 
in February 1965 after being proposed by Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. Malaysia’s attendance was from the beginning. (Asian Regional Cooperation 
Study group of Foreign Ministry 1972, 18-21).
6 Entire above document from Australian ambassador to Kim (700-66) 11, February 
1972, above document.
7 Meeting minutes 〔Minister Kim/Toh Chor Keat, Malaysian ambassador to Korea〕 2, 
February 1972, above document.
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against communist regimes. At the same time, it intended to establish a 
regional cooperative body similar to the organization of American States 
(oAS) in the Americas and the organization of African Unity (oAU) in 
Africa, rather than to promote anti-communist doctrine. Mindful of these 
objectives, the RoK government actively pursued charter enactment and 
established a secretariat to strengthen ASPAC as an organization. At the same 
time, it strongly opposed forming a military alliance within ASPAC to offset 
the weaker presence of the UK and the US because of a strong belief that such 
action would harm the sound development of the organization (Sang Hyun 
Lee 2010). However, the sudden US-PRC reconciliation forced the RoK 
government to adjust the direction of ASPAC.    
on March 11, 1982, during a press conference, Minister Kim showed 
the RoK government’s commitment to turn ASPAC into an economic 
cooperative body by stating that continued development of ASPAC was the 
goal of the RoK government, also asserting that the RoK government would 
propose measures to strengthen the solidarity among participating nations as 
well as promote life quality in those nations through modernization and trade 
promotion (Dong-A Ilbo March 11, 1972). In other words, the RoK sensed 
that political discussion regarding the PRC could result in the withdrawal of 
ASPAC members who wanted to rapidly recover relations with the PRC; thus, 
it quickly eliminated the political aspects of ASPAC and promoted economic 
solidarity instead.
At the same press conference, Kim revealed a plan to visit Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand starting on March 17. In his memoir, Kim recalled 
what he planned for ASPAC’s future as follows: “I thought that a close 
relationship with ASEAN was the basis to secure the ASPAC’s presence 
under the political atmosphere at the time. My plan was for ASPAC nations 
to participate in ASEAN as observers and involve ASEAN members, namely, 
Indonesia and Singapore, to attend ASPAC as observers, which would lay out 
a solid relationship between the two regional bodies.”
In fact, the relationship between ASPAC and ASEAN has been a topic 
of discussion among the participants since the launch of ASEAN in 1967. 
The main difference between the two is that ASEAN is a sub-regional 
body formed by the Southeastern Asian countries whereas ASPAC was 
broader, formed by free countries in the Northeast, Southeast, and oceania. 
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However, no one could deny a common thread running through the two 
organizations because both aimed to promote economic, cultural, and 
social cooperation. For this reason, in the initial stage of ASEAN, the idea to 
combine the two was brought up often (NIKKEI August 8, 1968).8 In fact, the 
joint statement adopted at the third ministerial meeting in Canberra in 1968 
included the following paragraph: “The ministers welcomed the idea to have 
multiple organizations with similar purposes. The overlap in their members 
will make the cooperation more harmonious and close. The ministers paid 
close attention that the ASPAC standing committee welcomed the launch of 
ASEAN.” What this meant with respect to the relationship between the two 
organizations was cooperation and supplementation, not rivalry, at least on 
the surface.
However, the trend for a few years after that statement proved that the 
cooperation existed only on paper. No actions were followed and ASPAC and 
ASEAN remained two independent organizations separate from each other. 
Against this backdrop, the RoK government was hopeful that by promoting 
cooperation between ASPAC and ASEAN, it would be able to stave off 
ASPAC members from withdrawing their membership and, furthermore, 
newly add Indonesia and Singapore to ASPAC. Another merit that the RoK 
government saw was that by appearing to have cooperation with ASEAN, 
which declared itself neutral in 1971, ASPAC could promote its image as a 
non-political organization that did not promote any specific ideology.
Therefore, the RoK government attempted individual contact with 
ASEAN members. The first country that RoK representatives visited was 
8 For example, the director of Asian affairs in Japan, ogawa, said that ASPAC and 
ASEAN would unify at the meeting with the UK in November 1967 and that once 
the Vietnam War had ended, this would be accelerated.  Minister Thanat Khoman of 
Thailand, at a press conference in July 1968, said that “ASPAC unifying with ASEAN 
is not completely unlikely. However, although they have a common denominator, 
ASEAN is <a compact community> while ASPAC covers a wider region with different 
nationals with different foreign policies.” Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of 
Malaysia said on August 7, 1968, that “ASPAC and ASEAN’s unification is a good 
idea.” Memorandum, Tokyo to Laking, “ASPAC and Japan,” 26, december 1967, 
ABHS, 950, W4627, PM 434/11/1 Part 5, Box 4674, NZNA;
 Telegram from Saigon (890) 26 July 1968. diplomatic document of Japan (2008-
00358).
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Malaysia. At that time, Malaysia seemed highly likely to withdraw from 
ASPAC since it had exerted extra diplomatic efforts in Northeast Asia after 
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Conference in 1971 while also pursuing better 
relations with communist regimes such as the democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (dPRK). Therefore, identifying Malaysia’s true intention and 
convincing it to stay in ASPAC were among the direst challenges for the RoK 
government.
Minister Yongsik Kim arrived at the Kuala Lumpur airport on March 16, 
1972, for talks with Prime Minister Razak the next day. Kim wrote in his 
memoir (1987, 263): “I continuously emphasized that the objective of ASPAC 
is to contribute to social and economic development in Northeast and 
Southeast Asia and not to promote security. (omitted) I also made a strong 
point that Malaysia’s presence in ASPAC is essential to fulfill such objective.” 
Kim, after the talk, recalled the achievement as follows: “Malaysia promised 
to send a ministerial-level official to the ASPAC general meeting, which 
eliminated worries that ASPAC may collapse” (Dong-A Ilbo March 18, 1972).
The next destination was Indonesia. Indonesia was important since it was 
a founder of ASEAN. Thus, it was critical that the RoK government convince 
Indonesia to form cooperation between ASPAC and ASEAN. In his memoir, 
Kim recalled (1987, 264) that the talks with Foreign Minister Malik on March 
20 were the most important in his visit to Southeast Asia. Kim proposed 
(1987, 265) to exchange observers between ASEAN and ASPAC and Minister 
Malik responded by asserting that “economic cooperation between ASPAC 
and ASEAN is feasible; however, it has to be preceded by ASPAC declaring its 
non-political, non-military, and non-ideological nature.”
The last destination was Thailand, which along with the RoK played a 
pivotal role in establishing ASPAC. Thailand was also a member of both 
ASPAC and ASEAN; therefore, the RoK had high expectations of the Thai 
government. According to Kim’s memoir (1987, 268), Kim called on Prime 
Minister Thanom Kittikachorn; during the talks on March 22, he said that 
ASPAC needed to act as an organization promoting economic, social, and 
cultural cooperation along with ASEAN and that Thailand would play the 
bridging role between the two organization. Minister Thanom agreed to this. 
Upon returning from his trip on March 24, Kim evaluated his 10 days in 
Southeast Asia by saying that “no members will leave ASPAC. The ASEAN 
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members I visited recognized the value of regional cooperation” (Dong-A Ilbo 
March 25, 1972).
Contrary to Kim’s evaluation, however, his trip to Southeast Asia did not 
yield any substantial results.9 The starkest evidence was failure to secure a 
promise of cooperation from Malaysia. According to the foreign ministry in 
New Zealand, Kim requested cooperation of the Malaysian government, but 
Minister Razak did not show any interest in cooperation between ASEAN 
and ASPAC. In fact, it was barely discussed.10 Regarding Razak’s promise that 
he would send a “due representative” to the June ministerial meeting, what 
he meant was the Malaysian ambassador to Korea, not a ministerial-level 
representative as KIM understood.11 Kim ultimately failed to persuade 
the Malaysian government to send a ministerial-level representative. Also, 
Minister Malik of Indonesia released a statement two days after the talks 
regarding the cooperation between ASPAC and ASEAN indicating that 
ASPAC was an anti-communist body similar to SEATo whereas ASEAN was 
a non-political organization that only promotes economic cooperation; thus, 
cooperation with ASPAC was impossible unless it completely eliminated its 
political affiliation (Dong-A Ilbo March 24, 1972). 
III.  THE oPENINg oF THE SEoUL MINISTERIAL 
MEETINg ANd ITS LIMITATIoNS
 
1. The response by the ROK government
Ten days before the opening of the meeting, the foreign ministry of the RoK 
announced its basic policy direction. In a document titled “Basic direction 
for the 7th ASPAC Ministerial Meeting,” the RoK government laid out three 
9 The New Zealand ambassador at the fifth committee meeting said that Kim’s trip was 
without any success since he did not say much. Memorandum, Seoul to Wellington, 4 
April 1972, ABHS, 950, W4627, PM 434/11/1 Part 12B, Box 4676, NZNA.
10 Telegram from Kuala Lumpur (343), 5, April 1972, ABHS, 950, W4727, PM 434/11/1 
Part12B, Box 4676, NZNA.
11 Telegram from Tokyo (128), 29, March 1972, ABHS, 950, W4627, PM 434/11/1 Part 
12B, Box 4676, NZNA.
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basic policy directions:
 
(1)  Continued emphasis on the RoK effort to maintain regional peace and 
promote flexible foreign policy to solidify diplomatic foundations in the 
Asia region
(2)  Emphasis on ASPAC as a regional cooperative body and highlight of the 
economic, social, and cultural cooperation to strengthen its presence
(3) Keeping the dPRK in check against intrusion into the Asia region by 
highlighting the RoK’s sovereign effort and commitment to ease tension in 
the Korean peninsula12
The above listed items have several implications. First, the RoK government 
recognized ASPAC as pivotal in its diplomatic efforts in the Asia region and, 
second, it strove to change the face of ASPAC by eliminating its political 
affiliation. Third, it had high hopes for the role ASPAC could play to keep 
dPRK in check so that it did not spread its influence in the Asia region, 
which kicked into high gear after Nixon’s visit to China.
It also proposed to clearly indicate the exact nature of ASPAC in the joint 
statement and also to strengthen the functionality of the organization. The 
document proposed four new functions of ASPAC and it solidified the RoK 
government’s ASPAC policy:
(1)  ASPAC promotes peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region as a 
regional cooperative body.
(2)  ASPAC is neither a political nor a military body against a third country.
(3)  going forward, ASPAC will focus on promoting economic, social, and 
cultural cooperation within the region.
(4)  ASPAC is not a closed organization and is open to all countries in the 
region.13
As previously indicated, Kim wanted to turn ASPAC from a political body to 
an economic body after the US-China summit. The above listed items more 
12 division 2, Southeast Asian Affairs “Basic stances on ASPAC ministerial meeting,” 
1972, 6,3 『ASPAC Ministerial meeting, the 7th. Seoul, 1972.6.14 -16 (V.1 Basic 
document)』 RoK diplomatic document C-0053-02.
13 div 2, Southeast Asian Affairs, above document.
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clearly solidified the RoK government›s stance.
Another significant fact to note is that the policy showed where the RoK 
stood in terms of China. It called on the RoK government to “soften the 
attitude toward China so as not to provoke and that the RoK government 
hopes that the US-PRC and the US-USSR reconciliation can lead to the 
easing of tension in the region.” Considering that the RoK government 
consistently emphasized the importance of a joint response to the communist 
threat from the PRC, this new and more flexible policy meant a great switch 
in policy direction.
 
2. The Opening of the Seoul Ministerial Meeting
Would the ASPAC continue in this new political climate created by US-
PRC reconciliation? or would it collapse? The Seoul meeting garnered great 
attention since it provided clues about the continued existence of ASPAC. The 
foreign press regarded it as significant since it was the first foreign ministerial 
meeting, except for the participation by Malaysia and Australia, since the US-
PRC and US-USSR summit.
The ASPAC ministerial meeting in transition took place on June 14, 1972, 
at the Central Building in Seoul. President Jeonghee Park, six years after the 
first meeting in 1966, said in his opening remarks that “ASPAC is not a body 
to provide either political or military response towards a third country or 
another region” and “I wish for many more countries in the region, regardless 
of their ideology and political system, to participate in this effort to promote 
peace and prosperity in this region.” By asserting such, he emphasized not 
only the non-political, non-ideological, and non-military nature of ASPAC, 
but also his commitment to keep ASPAC intact (Dong-A Ilbo June 14, 1982). 
This meant a departure from his previous stance of six years earlier when he 
claimed that “negotiation is not enough to fight against communism and it 
sometimes requires force” (Yomiuri Shimbun June 14, 1966 (evening paper)).
on June 15, Kim delivered the keynote address during non-official talks at 
the Chosun Hotel. In that speech, he delivered the basic principles of ASPAC 
policy: (1) broader exchanges among member nations and more exchanges 
among scholars, journalists, economists, and athletes, (2) establishment 
of a standing committee to promote ASEAN-ASPAC cooperation, and 
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(3) establishment of a special committee to promote economic and trade 
relations (Dong-A Ilbo June 15, 1972). Kim also showed a flexible attitude 
toward the PRC by asserting that the summit between the US and PRC and 
the US and USSR eased tension in the Asia region. This was in stark contrast 
to Taiwanese Foreign Minister Shen Chang-Hwan, who emphasized in his 
keynote address that “President Nixon’s visit to the PRC has not changed the 
stance of the Taiwanese government. our objective is still to prevent PRC and 
US dominance in Asia.”14
The joint statement adopted on the last day evaluated the US-PRC 
and the US-USSR summit. It confirmed that “it was beneficial to ease the 
tension in the Asia Pacific region” (Clause 3) and it reaffirmed the need to 
change the trajectory of ASPAC toward the non-military and non-political. 
Regarding the most sensitive PRC issue, it concluded that Taiwan and other 
members did not bring up the PRC issue and that the two US-led summits 
were beneficial for the region. Additionally, regarding the political climate 
of the Indo-China region where the war was becoming more serious, the 
only statement made was “we sympathize with Vietnam’s support to sustain 
independence” as Japan and some other members opposed taking a strong 
position (Yomiuri Shimbun June 16, 1972 (evening paper)). 
The seventh ministerial meeting over three days ended with the release of 
the above mentioned statement and appointing Thailand as the next meeting’s 
host. 
 
3. Limitations of the Seoul Ministerial Meeting
As the host of the Seoul ministerial meeting, the foreign ministry of the 
RoK commanded its outcome in three ways: (1) The RoK’s stance was well 
reflected in the joint statement, (2) it provided an opportunity to clarify 
the foreign policy direction of the RoK government and to secure a main 
responsibility in Asia diplomacy through ASPAC, and (3) it secured ASPAC’s 
14 The foreign minister report to the president, “The result of the 7th ministerial meeting,” 
18, June 1972, 『ASPAC Ministerial meeting, The 7th. Seoul, 14-16, June 1972 (V.6 
Result and joint statement)』 RoK diplomatic document C-0053-07.
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presence by scheduling the next meeting in Bangkok.15
The meeting was indeed a success considering that the collapse of 
ASPAC was brought up after the US-PRC reconciliation, which was turned 
around by the Seoul meeting in which the new objective of the organization 
was promoted, garnering support from the member nations. It was also 
meaningful in that it lessened the danger of collapse by securing Bangkok as 
host of the next meeting, which can be seen as an achievement.
However, the Seoul meeting had innate limitations in that it publicly 
promoted turning ASPAC into an economic cooperative body. one aspect of 
this is seen in the fact that the Taiwan issue was absent from the discussion. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the presence of Taiwan would determine 
the existence of ASPAC. However, due to its critical nature, the participating 
nations preferred to stay away from this topic for it would almost immediately 
bring on the organization’s collapse. Many agreed that it was better to keep 
ASPAC intact until the political atmosphere in Asia stabilized somewhat.
Another limitation came from the fact that its attempt to become an 
economic body diluted the original mission of ASPAC. of course, the 
elimination of political affiliation somewhat eased the tension between 
Taiwan and nations that wanted to better relations with the PRC. However, 
from the perspective of nations that wanted the mediocre political affiliation 
of ASPAC, turning into an economic body would lessen its importance.16 
Also, this switch was a makeshift measure to sustain ASPAC’s existence. 
From the Australian government’s perspective, ASPAC as an economic 
organization would have no merit since it would overlap with ECAFE and the 
Colombo Plan.17  
15 Foreign minister report to the president, “The result of the 7th ministerial meeting,” 18, 
June 1972, 『ASPAC Ministerial meeting, The 7th. Seoul, 14-16, June 1972 (V.6 Result 
and joint statement)』 RoK diplomatic document C-0053-07.
16 Australia, Japan, and New Zealand wanted to promote an Asian version of the 
Commonwealth Body to weaken the anti-communist nature of ASPAC. This was a 
loose body that only promoted a sense of regional solidarity by freely discussing the 
region’s pending issues (Sang Hyun Lee 2012). 
17 Memorandum, d.g. Nutter to the secretary, “ASPAC Ministerial Meeting: Australian 
Policy,” 6 June 1972, A1838, 541/2/7 Part 1, National Archives of Australia [hereafter 
cited as NAA].
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Post-war Japan re-emerged as a member of the free Asian countries by 
signing the Treaty of San Francisco. The US-Japan Security Treaty laid the 
foundation for the post-war Japanese foreign policy. It was not unrelated 
to the US-led Cold War strategy that Japan chose not to form diplomatic 
ties with PRC, but instead opted to sign a peace treaty with Taiwan. Therefore, 
the PRC policy of the Japanese government was limited to maintaining an 
economic relationship (Sadako ogata 1992, Ch 4). 
Japan’s PRC policy was significantly influenced by the US government’s 
Asia policy. Therefore, the Japanese government felt an immense amount 
of shock and betrayal when President Nixon released a statement regarding 
his visit to China without consulting Japan. This unilateral decision had 
a great impact on Japanese foreign policy and provided a direct cause for 
normalization of PRC-Japan relations.
Prime Minister Sato resigned after delivering his promise to take back 
okinawa after reigning for the seven years since 1964, and Tanaka followed. 
As the prime minister, Tanaka announced the normalization of PRC-Japan 
relations as the utmost important task and showed his commitment by 
appointing ohira, who was keen on this task, as a foreign minister (Ryuji 
Hattori 2011).
Within three months of taking office, Tanaka held talks with Minister 
Zhou Enlai in Beijing. Four days later, a joint statement was released 
making the normalization of the inter-relations official. This marked the 
end to the awkward relations Japan had had with the PRC since the peace 
treaty with Taiwan was signed in 1952. Minister ohira, immediately after 
the joint statement was released, said that “[this] step indicates that the 
peace treaty with Taiwan is no longer meaningful and it is practically null 
(Asahi Shimbun September 29, 1972 (evening paper)). Although he did not 
specifically say “cut ties,” the practical meaning was the cutting of diplomatic 
ties with Taiwan.  
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The normalization accelerated the restructuring of order in the Asia 
region. Needless to say, the most shocked nation was Taiwan. Taiwan was 
already somewhat isolated from the global community by withdrawal from 
the UN and Nixon’s visit to the PRC; however, the normalization of PRC-
Japan relations made it total. In addition, Japan was the first ASPAC country 
to approve the PRC and was followed by other ASPAC nations. Therefore, the 
PRC-Japan normalization was a direct cause of the ASPAC collapse.18 I will 
describe this further later, but Japan found itself having to care for Taiwan, 
which became further isolated after the cutting of diplomatic ties by Japan, 
and this left an impression on Japan’s Asia policy, especially its ASPAC policy.
2. The dilemma of the Japanese government
Sparked by the normalization of relations with the PRC, Japan started to 
thoroughly review its Asia policy. It was during this time that ASPAC became 
a hurdle for the Japanese government. As of now, no record is available that 
explains Japan’s ASPAC policy in post-normalization of the PRC-Japan 
relations, but records by close partners Australia and New Zealand indicate 
that the Japanese government was divided into “remain in” and “withdraw 
from” ASPAC after ties with the PRC were reestablished. 
From the “remain in” perspective, Japan had to stay in ASPAC to provide 
the minimum care for the Taiwanese government. As previously indicated, 
Taiwan’s further isolation was sparked by its expulsion from the UN in 1971 
followed by its withdrawal from other international organizations. ASPAC 
was one of the few in which Taiwan was still a member. Therefore, Japan had 
to be careful in withdrawing from ASPAC; causing the body to collapse would 
only worsen relations with Taiwan. Furthermore, Japan was one of the very 
first ASPAC members to recover ties with the PRC, which made Japan guilty 
of endangering ASPAC’s existence, which ultimately caused Japan to hesitate 
to withdraw from the organization. 
Meanwhile, others in Japan thought that staying in ASPAC, which 
promoted “blocking the PRC,” would harm Japan, which had made forming 
18 Australia and New Zealand normalized their relations with the PRC in december 
1972, followed by Malaysia (1974), Thailand (1975), and the Philippines (1975).
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friendly ties with the PRC a priority. They claimed that they now had an 
opportunity to promote comprehensive diplomacy as exchanges with the 
communist regimes were to be spurred, and remaining in ASPAC would only 
be a hindrance. There was also a danger that such decision would provoke the 
PRC as its possible reaction was completely unknown because ASPAC was 
not on the agenda during the PRC-Japan summit. In other words, remaining 
in ASPAC was a sensitive issue for Japan, which normalized its ties with 
the PRC under the “one China” belief and remaining could have resulted in 
diplomatic conflict with the PRC. 
Thus, Japan was in a dilemma and faced with the danger of provoking 
either the PRC or Taiwan based on its stance in terms of ASPAC. 
Consequently, it decided to remain in ASPAC to maintain a working-level 
relationship with Taiwan. At that time, Japan was in “diplomatic negotiation 
without diplomatic ties” with Taiwan after the ties were cut and it felt a need 
to maintain the practical relationship as it had been built over a considerable 
amount of time (Koeda 2000, 248). on october 4, during a talk with gordon 
Freeth, then the Australian ambassador to Japan, the director of the Asian 
Policy department, Akiyama, said that the priority of Japanese diplomacy 
was to sustain friendly relations with Taiwan as much as possible and that 
Japan would certainly remain in ASPAC in consideration of Taiwan.19 
V.  THE RESPoNSE ANd dISAPPoINTMENT BY THE RoK 
goVERNMENT
1. Recognition of the ROK government regarding the future of ASPAC
To the RoK government that was filled with high hopes of securing 
ASPAC’s existence after successfully holding the Seoul meeting, the PRC-
Japan normalization of relations indeed came as a shock. Faced with this 
new challenge, the RoK government started to seriously review the future 
of ASPAC. on october 30, a report titled “Administrative Research on the 
19 Record of Conversation, Akiyama and Jones, 4, october 1972, A1838, 541/6/1 Part 3, 
NAA.
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Future of ASPAC” was released.20 If the key policy behind holding the seventh 
ministerial meeting four months earlier was to find ways to strengthen 
ASPAC, the aim of this report shows how seriously the RoK government 
considered the situation since the report thoroughly examines the possible 
future of ASPAC, including its collapse, the forming of a new organization, 
integration with other existing regional bodies, and other alternatives.  
First, the merit of an ASPAC collapse was identified and it was determined 
that a collapse would not hurt RoK-Taiwan relations. However, this scenario 
had several demerits, according to the report. First, the RoK government’s 
basis for its Asia policy was completely destroyed. Second, the solidarity 
built so far was weakened. Third, it eliminated the regional body that could 
fight against colonialism. Fourth, the investment and effort made in five 
joint projects would be void. Fifth, it would be more difficult to prevent 
the dPRK from entering the Northeast Asia region. Sixth, ASPAC was the 
only organization that could prevent Japan from being the sole power in the 
region. This showed that the RoK government saw many more demerits than 
merits. 
If a new body were to be formed, it could resolve the Taiwan issue and it 
would rightly reflect the new political order in the region. However, it would 
mean that the RoK would lose the sovereignty it enjoyed within ASPAC, 
as well as the diplomatic status it garnered through ASPAC, and would be a 
weaker voice in the new body. 
only demerits were listed in the third scenario, which was integrating 
with another existing organization. First, if ASPAC were to unify with the 
Japan-led Northeast Asia development Ministerial Meeting, then (1) it 
would increase Japan’s voice within the organization and would make it 
difficult to keep Japan’s power in check in this region and (2) the economic 
development ministerial meeting was based on aid from Japan, which did 
not allow mutually beneficial relationship such as in ASPAC. If ASEAN and 
ASPAC were to combine, then (1) it would be difficult to adjust its foreign 
policy since ASEAN is neutral in the Northeast Asia region, 2) ASEAN 
had internal disagreements; therefore, it would lessen the efficiency of the 
20 division of Asian affairs, foreign ministry 「Administrative research on the future of 
ASPAC」 30, october 1972, RoK diplomatic document C-0052-16.
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regional cooperation, and (3) it would lessen the RoK’s diplomatic voice in 
this region. Based on the previous stated analysis, the tentative result was as 
follows: 
(1)  The ASPAC collapse would greatly weaken our diplomatic basis in the 
Southeast Asia region. 
(2)  Unification of ASPAC with other regional bodies comes with many hurdles 
and would lessen our diplomatic voice. 
(3)  If a new body is formed, our active participation is a must; however, it 
would be difficult to stave off the dPRK. 
(4)  Japan and other ASPAC members would not suggest the dismantlement 
voluntarily. Most would prefer to keep the status quo until an agreement is 
made. 
(5)  The dismantlement and the formation of a new organization would be 
promoted in the future.
(6)  Taiwan would not voluntarily withdraw from ASPAC and PRC interest in 
ASPAC would not change much.21
Based on this analysis, the report concluded that the best policy decision that 
the RoK could make was to sustain ASPAC’s existence. The following were 
the measures to do so:
(1)  Make discrete efforts to convince  ‘Free China’  to either participate as 
Taiwan as a regional representative or withdraw from ASPAC membership
(2)  Promote Japan, Malaysia, Australia, and other countries that either cut ties 
or have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan to host the ninth ministerial 
meeting, so that an invitation could be issued to Taiwan as ‘Free China.’ 
(3) (omitted)
(4)  Find measures to increase the member nations and develop diplomatic 
efforts. (Make efforts to start summit diplomacy with neutral nations, 
namely, Indonesia, Singapore, and India, to lay the foundation for regional 
cooperation with neutral nations.)
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2. The First Standing Committee Meeting in Bangkok (March 13, 1973)
As the host of the eighth ministerial meeting, Thailand’s government tried to 
select the meeting date in close consideration of the political climate in post 
US-PRC reconciliation. The Thai government announced that it would host 
the standing committee meeting on March 13 and the ministerial meeting 
between June and July.23 Had the Thai government kept delaying the decision, 
then Thailand might have been held liable for all the aftermath. By holding 
the standing committee meeting, any delayed items could finally be discussed 
in depth, and this could solidify the future of ASPAC. In fact, the then deputy 
foreign minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, stated during talks with the New 
Zealand ambassador that as long as some members were willing to attend, 
they would continue the effort to host the meeting.24 He also said during talks 
with the Korean ambassador that the Thai government would like to regard 
ASPAC as a club and that the dismantlement could take place when members 
no longer wanted to participate.25
The RoK government supported the Thai government’s decision. 
Minister Kim wrote in a letter to the RoK ambassador in Thailand that 
“the 1st standing committee meeting is the most important aspect for the 
future of ASPAC” and “to concert utmost effort with the host country so 
that the 8th ministerial meeting takes place as planned.”26 on the day of the 
meeting, Kim sent another directive to the RoK representative that “ASPAC’s 
continued existence” is what the RoK government promotes and to follow 
the majority opinion regarding the Taiwan issue. Also, if the Taiwan issue 
23 Entire letter from the RoK ambassador to Thailand to Kim (THW-0318) 7, March 
1973 『Members’ attitude towards the future of ASPAC』 RoK diplomatic document 
C-0063-02.
24 Telegram 227, Bangkok to Wellington, 5, March, 1973, ABHS, 950, W4627, PM 
434/11/1 Part 14, Box 4676, NZNA. 
25 Entire letter from the RoK ambassador to Thailand to Kim (THW-0318) 7, March 
1973 『Members’ attitude towards the future of ASPAC』 RoK diplomatic document 
C-0063-02.
26 Entire letter from the RoK ambassador to Thailand to Kim (WTH-0225) 9, March 
1973, above document.
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was not resolved, the directive said “to maintain the ministerial meeting and 
standing committee without the Taiwanese presence.”27 The RoK government 
did not want to become another Taiwan and wanted to avoid isolation even 
if it meant sacrificing relations with Taiwan.28 However, this was met with 
opposition. The Thai government made it clear that it would not strip any 
nation of its ASPAC membership and that as the host country it would not 
opt to un-invite any members.29
The announcement of the standing committee meeting came a week 
before the scheduled date and the member nations found themselves in a 
sticky situation. It was foreseeable that some countries would refuse to attend 
if there was a Taiwanese presence. Malaysia announced its official withdrawal 
and Australia, which was slowly reducing its presence, notified that it would 
be absent from the meeting. New Zealand, which formed diplomatic ties with 
the PRC, only dispatched representatives below the ministerial level.
As scheduled, the standing committee meeting in Bangkok took place 
27 Foreign ministry “directives to RoK representatives to the 1st ASPAC standing 
committee meeting” 13, March 1973, above document.
28 The improvement of US-PRC relations was made without any preparation or 
consideration of the US allies, which created isolation and concern for the RoK. 
It seemed as if the US sacrificed the benefits of the RoK. Park’s administration 
promoted reformation to strengthen domestic solidarity and defense, even developing 
a nuclear program in secret (Victor 1999). Furthermore, the RoK even considered 
improving relations with supporters of the dPRK to ease the fear of abandonment. 
For example, according to an internal diplomatic document made right after the PRC 
joined the UN, the RoK recognized Taiwan as the official China. However, now that 
the PRC had joined the UN, the RoK worried that it would end up in global isolation. 
Therefore, RoK indicated in several documents that “RoK needed diplomatic 
flexibility,” and the “PRC cannot be denied. Taiwan is not to be considered when 
establishing relations with the PRC.” At the same time, the RoK recognition that 
the relationship with Taiwan could not be deserted completely was shown through 
statements such as “practical relations need to continue without expanding it further” 
and “economic relations continue without increasing political ties.” Internal document 
(information 770-2911) 「Taiwan’s stay in UN」 12, November 1971 『RoK stances 
on Chinese representation in international organization, 1971』 RoK diplomatic 
document C-0044-01; 1st division of Southeast Asian affairs 「RoK-PRC relations 
under the changing climate」 30, october 1972 『PRC policy of RoK,1972』 RoK 
diplomatic document C-0051-03. 
29 Above document.
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on March 13 with only seven nations in attendance. The focal point of this 
meeting was discussing the next ASPAC ministerial meeting agenda. The 
RoK, Taiwan, and Vietnam promoted a July meeting to which Japan, New 
Zealand, and the Philippines responded by opting for an indefinite delay. As 
a result, the attendees concluded by agreeing to decide in the next standing 
committee meeting suggested by the Thai government and the discussion 
around the future of ASPAC was delayed once again.  
 
3. The ROK Diplomacy to ASPAC
As a result of the standing committee meeting on March 13, the RoK 
government undertook activities to eliminate hurdles in holding the 
next ministerial meeting by promoting close relationships with the other 
stakeholders. Specific activities included asking the US for support and 
convincing Taiwan.
 
1) Discussion with the US
Two days after the Bangkok meeting, deputy Minister Seokhyeon Yoon 
visited the US embassy to talk with Ambassador Francis Underhill, who 
had temporarily replaced William Porter. This was to explain the RoK’s 
ASPAC policy and to gain an understanding from the US.30 This seemed 
like preparatory efforts since Minister Kim had a meeting with Ambassador 
Underhill the next day.     Yoon began by saying that “the weak countries in 
Asia need a regional body to discuss with multiple countries. ASPAC is such 
a necessary body and it needs to exist until a replacement is created.” Yoon 
also expressed disappointment regarding the withdrawal of Malaysia and 
soon Australia, but also showed hope for ASPAC’s future. Furthermore, Yoon 
explained that the innate problem was not the presence of Taiwan, but rather 
a lack of proactive-ness from the member nations. Additionally, the PRC had 
no interest in ASPAC; therefore, ASPAC membership was no hindrance in 
efforts to improve relations with the PRC. This was partly a complaint of the 
30 Telegram from Seoul (1588), “RoKg Views on ASPAC,” 15, March 1973, PoL 3 
ASPAC, SNF, Box 1854, Rg59, National Archives at College Park [hereafter cited as 
NA].
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RoK government toward some nations that had attempted to freeze ASPAC 
with the PRC as an excuse.  
on March 16, Minister Kim held a meeting with Underhill.31 Kim asserted 
that the RoK, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and New Zealand were 
the core members of ASPAC. With these five members, ASPAC had value 
and if these five countries could recommit to saving ASPAC, then Japan 
would follow suit. Kim reminded Underhill that the US had played a large 
part in establishing ASPAC and inquired whether the same support could 
be expected to save it. This was the real reason behind Kim’s meeting with 
Underhill. However, the response was negative. Underhill stated his personal 
opinion that the ASPAC issue could not be resolved with help from the US.
A letter arrived from the US department of State two days later supporting 
Underhill’s opinion. The letter said that although the US acknowledged the 
contribution of ASPAC to the regionalism in East Asia, only the absence of 
the US in this matter would resolve the problem. The letter also asserted that 
the survival of ASPAC was up to the member nations considering the passive 
attitude of some of them, including Malaysia. US intervention would be 
meaningless under such circumstances and the respective diplomatic efforts 
would be unfair, the letter read. In other words, the US state department 
promoted the Asianization of Asia under the Nixon doctrine; thus, the 
resurrection of ASPAC depended on sovereign efforts, especially from the 
RoK, and US intervention would only create harm.32
In fact, the US policy toward ASPAC under Nixon was expressed 
by Marshall green, creator of the Nixon doctrine and assistant deputy 
director of Northeast Asia and Asian Pacific Affairs. In July 1972, green said 
the following: “ASPAC is a regional group that was driven by the initiative 
by the regional countries without US participation or intervention. Based on 
the Nixon doctrine, our long-term policy is to stay away from any form of 
intervention in the Asian efforts. We believe that the rapid political change in 
the North Asia upon President’s visit to the PRC is a testament of our policy’s 
31 Telegram from Seoul (1592), “RoK Effort to Preserve ASPAC,” 16, March 1973, PoL 3 
ASPAC, SNF, Box 1854, Rg59, NA.
32 Telegram to Seoul (049778), “Effort to Preserve ASPAC,” 17, March 1973, PoL 3 
ASPAC, SNF, Box 1854, Rg59, NA.
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effectiveness.”33
during the process of forming ASPAC, the US government provided 
side support to ease the global isolation of the RoK and Taiwan, which were 
keeping the dPRK in check in the North Asia region. The policy to support 
Asian regionalism shown in President Johnson’s promise of aid support for 
Southeast Asian cooperation during his speech at Johns Hopkins University 
in April 1965 was another reason behind US side support for ASPAC. 
However, the US decided that its continuous intervention actually harmed the 
Asian initiatives; therefore, it started to promote a non-intervention stance in 
ASPAC matters.
Such policy continued throughout the Nixon administration. The Asian 
policy of the Nixon administration, represented by the Nixon doctrine, 
only meant that the US would decrease its presence in Asia. From the Asian 
regionalism perspective, the intention was to focus on the relationship 
with the regional body to avoid direct intervention in Asian affairs and also 
to respect the sovereignty of each Asian nation (Jong-Won Lee 1993, 220-
226). In sum, if the regionalism policy of the Johnson administration was 
to gain advantage in the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration’s Asian 
diplomacy had its focus on using regional organization to reduce an excessive 
external defense commitment.
Therefore, as represented by the Nixon doctrine, the US was consistent 
in claiming that ASPAC was a regional cooperative body born out of 
Asian initiatives and that its existence was the responsibility of the relevant 
countries and the US should not interfere.
 
2) Failure to Convince Taiwan
After the RoK failed to achieve US support, its last hope was to convince 
Taiwan to secure the ASPAC’s existence. Minister Kim called the Taiwanese 
ambassador to Korea, Lo Yingde, to the Foreign Ministry to convey where the 
33 Airgarm to Bangkok (A-7722), Canberra, djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Rangoon, 
Saigon, Seoul, Singapore, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, “ECoCEN: gNZ Concern over 
U.S. Involvement with ASPAC Agency,” 31, July 1972, PoL 3 ASPAC, SNF, Box 1854, 
Rg59, NA.
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RoK stood.34 Kim laid out the precondition that the Taiwanese government 
had to make the decision and that, regardless of the decision, the bilateral 
relations between the RoK and Taiwan would not change.  Then, Kim asked 
whether the maintenance of ASPAC or the formation of a new regional 
body as promoted by Japan and Australia in which the PRC participates 
had a closer fit with Taiwan’s interests. However, Lo was not convinced that 
not sending a representative to the next ministerial meeting would prevent 
ASPAC from collapsing and fight off the Japanese effort to form a new 
regional body.
on April 7, Minister Kim called Lo back and asked for an answer again.35 
Kim asserted that if Taiwan would cooperate, then the RoK would do its 
utmost to convince the member nations and that this would be the last 
appeal to Taiwan. What lay underneath this comment was Kim’s belief that 
once Taiwan was convinced not to attend the ministerial meeting, then he 
would gain leverage to persuade Japan to help sustain ASPAC when he visited 
Foreign Minister ohira of Japan on April 13.
on the day before the meeting between Kim and Lo, Taiwanese Foreign 
Minister Shen Chang-hwan also called gyewon Kim, the RoK ambassador 
to Taiwan, to push him regarding the RoK proposal to China to discuss the 
continental shelf issue. This concerns the March 16 event when the RoK 
refuted the article by Xinhua that criticized the RoK for using underwater 
resources in the South Sea and the East China Sea. In this refutation, the 
RoK used the PRC’s official name for the first time, which meant that the 
RoK was becoming more flexible toward the PRC than before (Dong-A Ilbo 
March 17, 1973). Shen thought this was a populist response and inquired 
about the real intention behind it. At that time, the RoK government was 
pursuing the Hallstein policy of its own and becoming more flexible toward 
communist nations, including the PRC. Therefore, Taiwan’s concern was 
justified. Additionally, Shen asserted that the RoK was promoting activities 
34 Meeting minutes [Foreign Minister Kim/RoK Ambassador to China Youngdeok Na] 
3, April 1973, 『Meeting minutes with Ambassador Na, 1973-1974』 RoK diplomatic 
document C-0075-06.
35 Above document. 
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to make Taiwan withdraw its ASPAC membership by convincing third 
countries and asked, “Is RoK so desperate to sustain ASPAC that it will harm 
the friendly relations with Taiwan?”36
  Considering these heated circumstances, the Taiwanese government was 
quite provoked by the April 7 suggestion made by Minister Kim. on April 
9, Shen called Ambassador Kim to his office and provided the following 
memorandum:
(1)  What Minister Kim said to ambassador Na on April 7th regarding ASPAC 
is a shock to the Taiwanese government and unacceptable as a sovereign 
nation.
(2) (omitted)
(3)  It is unrealistic to think that ASPAC’s continued existence will prevent the 
creation of a new regional body. If Japan or Australia identifies the need 
and sees it as possible, nothing can prevent it.
(4) (omitted)
(5)  We will consider all suggestion that affect the Taiwanese representation as 
aggressive. Thus, we call on the RoK government to avoid any action that 
will adversely affect our vital interest.37 
Shen added to the memorandum that the ASPAC issue had to be resolved 
from the sovereignty perspective and that this should not harm the traditional 
positive relations that the two countries had. 
on April 10, Lo delivered the same memorandum to Minister Kim. 
Immediately upon reading the note, Kim expressed his uneasiness that the 
memo was a result of misunderstanding and that the intention of the RoK 
was falsely received.38 However, the memorandum was sufficient to make 
the RoK recognize that it reflected the opinion of the Taiwanese public as 
well as that of the executive branch, and also that Taiwan had no intention of 
36 Entire letter from RoK ambassador to Taiwan to Kim (CHW-0409) 3, April 1973 
『Member nations attitude towards the future of ASPAC』 RoK diplomatic document 
C-0063-02.
37 Entire letter from RoK ambassador to Taiwan to Kim (CHW-0409) 1973, above 
document.
38 Meeting minutes [Foreign Minister Kim/RoK Ambassador to China Youngdeok Na], 
above document.
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voluntarily removing itself from ASPAC. 
Thus, the RoK effort to convince Taiwan to voluntarily withdraw its 
ASPAC membership and save the organization met with failure. Taiwan 
probably chose the collapse of ASPAC over voluntary resignation only 
to be replaced by the PRC, which was the worst possible scenario under 
circumstances in which even a longtime friend, the RoK, chose to better 
relations with the PRC. Meanwhile, the RoK, which was in a dilemma 
between maintaining friendly relations with Taiwan and securing ASPAC, 
had no sufficient reason to choose ASPAC over harming relations with 
Taiwan. Thus, their bilateral relationship started to seek a remedy. 
4. The Second Bangkok Standing Committee Meeting (1973.6.1)
The second meeting was held on June 1, 1973, and again, seven countries 
attended, except for Malaysia and Australia. It had been two months since the 
first meeting. The main agenda was clearly divided even before the meeting. 
Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Taiwan insisted on delaying the 
meeting. This request was met with agreement by the RoK and Vietnam, and 
the decision was made to “postpone (the next meeting) until the appropriate 
time comes.” Therefore, ASPAC met its demise seven years after its beginning 
in Seoul in 1966. 
As ASPAC was announced as nullified, the sub-agencies became an issue 
of contention, including the  Cultural and Social Center (RoK), Registry of 
Scientific and Technical Services (Australia), Economic Cooperation Center 
(Thailand), Food and Fertilizer Technology Center (Taiwan), and Food 
Processing Center (the Philippines), which was under construction. during 
the meeting, the RoK proposed the creation of a consultative body to sustain 
these sub-agencies, which many countries did not want to see disappear. 
Behind such a proposal hid the RoK intention to save ASPAC in case the 
standing committee lost its authority.39 However, Japan and New Zealand 
39 The RoK foreign ministry issued a directive to the RoK representative to ASPAC 
to form a body to discuss the future of ASPAC. Entire letter from Kim to the RoK 
ambassador to Thailand (WTH-0575) 30, May 1973 『ASPAC standing committee 
(1973) 1-2. Bangkok』 RoK diplomatic document C-0063-04.
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disagreed. Consequently, the Thai government decided to “discuss with the 
respective countries the detailed after measures.”40
After that,  the RoK government set forth a plan to make the 
aforementioned consultative body into a new regional cooperative body 
without the membership of Taiwan. However, it failed to realize since 
Thailand showed no interest in the plan.41
VI. Conclusion
As the RoK was an exception in détente, the Asian détente of the early 1970s 
posed another challenge (Victor d. Cha 2004, 178). Faced with the North-
South confrontation, the RoK government had to be swift in adapting to 
changes in the political climate in the nearby countries, and its effort to save 
ASPAC stemmed from this reaction.  To the RoK of the 1970s, ASPAC was 
a breakwater against the dPRK’s influence in Southeast Asia and the only 
consultative body to keep the Japanese Asian policy in check. Therefore, the 
collapse of ASPAC could make the RoK’s Southeast policy basis significantly 
weaker, which the RoK has built since the mid-1960s. Additionally, as many 
countries tried to improve their relations with the PRC, this was the only way 
for the RoK to avoid the same isolated destiny as Taiwan. 
As the US-PRC reconciliation became a reality, the RoK government 
attempted to change the nature of ASPAC and to survive through cooperation 
with ASEAN. The RoK understood that by promoting cooperation with the 
neutral ASEAN, ASPAC could weaken its political affiliation and highlight 
its nature as an economic organization. By doing so, the RoK believed 
that ASPAC could survive in the changed global order. However, the 
normalization of PRC-Japan relations immediately after the Seoul ministerial 
meeting increased the RoK’s concern exponentially. To save ASPAC from the 
brink, the RoK asked the US for help and asked Taiwan to voluntarily leave 
40 Foreign ministry report to the president “The result of the 2nd standing committee 
meeting” 2, June 1973, above document.
41 Entire letter from Kim to the RoK ambassador to Thailand (WTH-0631) 14, June 
1973 『Member nations attitude towards the future of ASPAC』 RoK diplomatic 
document C-0063-02.
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the organization; however, the responses from both were negative. The US 
saw Asian intervention as meaningless because it promoted the Asianization 
of Asian issues, and Taiwan saw the RoK as hostile and against its own vital 
interests. 
despite the RoK effort, ASPAC met its demise. The main reason 
could be the collapse of the Cold War structure in Asia due to improved 
relations between the US and the PRC. of course, ASPAC was continually 
accompanied by conflicts around its purposes and direction. Also, analysis so 
far has shown that even faced with the dire situation regarding its existence, 
ASPAC could not find agreement in terms of its purpose. However, this 
was attributed to the fact that each member nation was in such a different 
situation with respect to economic development and political affiliation. It 
must not be overlooked that shared recognition existed among the member 
nations regarding ASPAC’s purpose that was to enable a dialogue on the 
regional issues.42 From this perspective, the cause of ASPAC’s collapse was 
not internal issues, but rather external changes. The premise of ASPAC was 
the Cold War global order represented by the confrontation between the US 
and the PRC. As they improved their relations, ASPAC’s meaning became 
diluted. The improvement in US-PRC relations and the normalization of 
PRC-Japan relations greatly affected the collapse and these two should not be 
left out in discussing ASPAC. 
The second reason was the premature response to the Taiwan issue. 
The US, which enjoyed absolute power over East Asia’s security, decided to 
reconcile with the PRC. Under such circumstances, ASPAC could only resort 
to changing the nature of the organization and becoming more flexible so that 
it could adapt to the new changes. Against this backdrop, Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand swiftly normalized their relations with the PRC and Taiwan 
became the biggest hurdle in safeguarding ASPAC. 
deciding that the Taiwan issue was the key to sustaining ASPAC, the RoK 
tried to persuade Taiwan to voluntarily give up its membership. However, 
this idea was met with severe opposition from Taiwan. As previously stated, 
the Taiwanese government saw this matter as a global representation issue as 
42 From this perspective, Hatori’s sense (Ryuji Hattori 2010, 207) that the collapse of 
ASPAC contributed to ease the Cold War tension in East Asia needs to be revised.
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well as one of vital national interest. Also, since many friends had decided to 
improve their relations with the PRC, Taiwan could not possibly leave ASPAC 
out of concern that the PRC might take its seat. Thus, the RoK attempt failed. 
There was no room for an organization in which China was represented by 
Taiwan when the global trend was moving toward reconciliation with the 
PRC. 
Finally, let us look at the present implications by reviewing the 
international relations surrounding ASPAC’s demise. The idea to establish 
an East Asia community emerged after the Asian financial Crisis of 1997. 
This idea progressed through ASEAN+3 and the regular holding of the East 
Asia Summit (EAS) after 2005. Ever since the idea was brought up, the focal 
issue has been the relationship between such a cooperative body and the 
US. In this regard, ASPAC provided us with a lot of implications. The US 
government’s Asian policy had a great impact in establishing and dismantling 
ASPAC. In other words, ASPAC was born during the mid-1960s when the 
US started to deeply engage in the Vietnam War, and it met its demise when 
the regional order started to change as a result of improvement in US-PRC 
relations. The US helped establish ASPAC by side-supporting the RoK in its 
Asia foreign minister’s meeting proposal in 1964. After its establishment, the 
US maintained its non-intervention stance. ASPAC excluded participation 
by out-of-region powerhouses, and its membership was only available to 
the regional countries. Thus, its merit was that free discussion was possible 
without any intervention from the global powers. However, it was not able 
to flexibly respond to changes in the US Asian policy. This implies that a 
regional body with only regional countries as its members, completely void 
of the US intervention that influenced the region nonetheless, was vulnerable 
to external factors, namely, the US policy change. This provides an important 
implication to the latest idea of forming East Asia Community. 
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